What is temporary personal protective grounding?
Sometimes, additional measures are desirable to provide an extra margin of safety assurance. Temporary personal protective grounds are used when working on de-energized electrical conductors to minimize the possibility of accidental re-energization from unexpected sources. Sometimes these are called safety grounds or equipotential grounding.
Induced voltages, capacitive recharging, and accidental contact with other circuits can occur. Depending on the electrical energy available, these occurrences could cause injury or death.
More often, however, they only cause reßexive actions. For example, although most induced voltages will not normally cause serious injury themselves, they could cause a person to jump backward suddenly, possibly tripping against something or falling to the floor.
Temporary protective grounding devices should be applied where such conditions might occur. Temporary personal protective grounds should be applied at possible points of re-energization. They can also be applied in such a way as to establish a zone of equipotential around a person.
When these grounds are used, they shall be connected tightly, since they establish a deliberate fault point in the circuit. If current does somehow get onto the circuit, the grounds shall stay connected securely until a protective device clears the circuit.
It is difficult to set firm criteria for when temporary personal protective grounds are needed. Blanket requirements are usually established. Many times, it is a decision made in the field by the person performing the work.
When there is uncertainty about exposure, it is wise to add this extra protection. Many industrial facilities and utilities require temporary personal protective grounding for all aerial power line work and for all work on power systems over 600 V because of the increased exposure these systems often have due to their length and location.
Temporary personal protective grounding can also be used as the additional safety measure required when hazardous electrical energy control must be performed using a tag only. Temporary personal protective grounding devices should meet the specifications in ASTM F855-96 and should be sized for the maximum available current of any possible event.
Temporary personal protective grounds should only be installed after all other conditions of an electrically safe work condition have been established. Because the unexpected can happen at any time, however, the installation and removal of temporary grounding devices should be performed, by procedure, as the conductors are energized.
When installed inside equipment enclosures, temporary grounds should be lengthy enough to extend outside of the equipment so that they can be easily seen. If they cannot extend out, they should be made highly visible. Brightly colored tapes are helpful identifiers. Once they are installed, bare-hand work could be permitted.
It should be quite obvious that all personal protective grounds must be removed prior to reenergization. Identification and accountability controls may be necessary on large construction or maintenance jobs. The installation and removal of these grounding devices can be controlled by permit in order to avoid re-energizing equipment into a faulted condition.
The integrity of personal protective grounds should be maintained through the use of periodic inspection and testing. It is a good idea to document this inspection and testing.
POOR HAZARDOUS ELECTRICAL ENERGY CONTROL PRACTICES
What are the examples of poor hazardous energy control practices.
The following items discuss some practices that were used in the past for safety control. These practices are not truly safe practices and should not be used today.
a) Locking out a push-button, control switch, or other pilot device does not ensure that the circuit will remain de-energized. A short circuit or ground in the control circuit can bypass the pilot device.
Another employee might even engage the contactor or starter by hand. Unless the disconnecting means is opened and locked out, an employee should not place himself in a position where unexpected equipment startup or energization might cause injury.
b) Turning the handle of a disconnect switch to the "off' position does not ensure safety. The switch linkage might be broken, leaving the switchblades engaged.
Switchblades in the open position should be confirmed by visual inspection. The load side of the switch should also be checked with a voltage tester to ensure that the outgoing circuit is de-energized, and that there is no backfeed.
c) Removing and tagging fuses does not constitute a lockout/tagout. A lockout/tagout device should be attached to the fuse clips in a manner such that no fuses can be inserted without removing the device.
If fuses are contained in a drawout fuse block, the tag should be attached to the fuse panel, not to the drawout block. Special precautions shall be taken to prevent shock whenever energized fuse clips that are accessible to the touch must be tagged.
d) Simply opening a power circuit breaker does not ensure safety. Even if the control fuses are removed, the breaker can still be engaged with the manual operating mechanism.
The switchgear must be racked away from the bus contacts and into the "fully disconnected" position, and the racking mechanism shall be locked and tagged.
The following items discuss some practices that were used in the past for safety control. These practices are not truly safe practices and should not be used today.
a) Locking out a push-button, control switch, or other pilot device does not ensure that the circuit will remain de-energized. A short circuit or ground in the control circuit can bypass the pilot device.
Another employee might even engage the contactor or starter by hand. Unless the disconnecting means is opened and locked out, an employee should not place himself in a position where unexpected equipment startup or energization might cause injury.
b) Turning the handle of a disconnect switch to the "off' position does not ensure safety. The switch linkage might be broken, leaving the switchblades engaged.
Switchblades in the open position should be confirmed by visual inspection. The load side of the switch should also be checked with a voltage tester to ensure that the outgoing circuit is de-energized, and that there is no backfeed.
c) Removing and tagging fuses does not constitute a lockout/tagout. A lockout/tagout device should be attached to the fuse clips in a manner such that no fuses can be inserted without removing the device.
If fuses are contained in a drawout fuse block, the tag should be attached to the fuse panel, not to the drawout block. Special precautions shall be taken to prevent shock whenever energized fuse clips that are accessible to the touch must be tagged.
d) Simply opening a power circuit breaker does not ensure safety. Even if the control fuses are removed, the breaker can still be engaged with the manual operating mechanism.
The switchgear must be racked away from the bus contacts and into the "fully disconnected" position, and the racking mechanism shall be locked and tagged.
LOCK OUT AND TAG OUT PERMIT BASIC INFORMATION
Some work requires rigid lockout/tagout control of the type that should not be the responsibility of the employee alone. Lockout/tagouts of this nature should be secured by a formal permit.
This more formal approach is called a documented lockout/tagout. Typically, this type of lockout/tagout would be used on those types of jobs that are not simple and easily understood.
Electrical work performed on medium- and high-voltage circuits is a good example. It would also include work on equipment that requires a complex lockout/tagout due to multiple sources of electrical energy.
Also included would be jobs that require work inside of grinding mills, choppers, fan housings, ovens, storage tanks and silos, and similar situations in which personnel are in a position that unexpected equipment start-up would, without question, result in serious injury or death.
In general, the documented lockout/tagout shall be used except when the conditions given in 29 CFR 1910.147 for a nondocumented lockout/tagout allow an exception.
No specific permit system can be recommended as good practice in all circumstances. A workable permit system can be developed only on an individual basis at the plant level by personnel intimately familiar with plant operations. Certain requirements that represent good practice in one plant might be inadequate or unworkable in another plant with different problems and a different personnel structure.
One fundamental feature, however, should be incorporated into any permit system. It should be designed with checks and balances.
Specific responsibility for a particular operation should be assigned to an individual without relieving others of the obligation to double-check the status of the lockout/tagout before proceeding with their own assigned steps in the process. The permit system, then, should be developed to duplicate and reinforce, rather than dilute, responsibility.
Every step in processing a lockout/tagout permit, from the initial request to the official closing, should be confirmed in writing on an official form. The permit form should include spaces for every person involved to indicate the times and dates when the paperwork was received and when the action was taken.
Completion of each step should be acknowledged by the signature of the person responsible for taking the appropriate action. Every person involved in processing the permit should be held responsible for checking the paperwork referred to them to see that everything is in order before proceeding with their own step.
This more formal approach is called a documented lockout/tagout. Typically, this type of lockout/tagout would be used on those types of jobs that are not simple and easily understood.
Electrical work performed on medium- and high-voltage circuits is a good example. It would also include work on equipment that requires a complex lockout/tagout due to multiple sources of electrical energy.
Also included would be jobs that require work inside of grinding mills, choppers, fan housings, ovens, storage tanks and silos, and similar situations in which personnel are in a position that unexpected equipment start-up would, without question, result in serious injury or death.
In general, the documented lockout/tagout shall be used except when the conditions given in 29 CFR 1910.147 for a nondocumented lockout/tagout allow an exception.
No specific permit system can be recommended as good practice in all circumstances. A workable permit system can be developed only on an individual basis at the plant level by personnel intimately familiar with plant operations. Certain requirements that represent good practice in one plant might be inadequate or unworkable in another plant with different problems and a different personnel structure.
One fundamental feature, however, should be incorporated into any permit system. It should be designed with checks and balances.
Specific responsibility for a particular operation should be assigned to an individual without relieving others of the obligation to double-check the status of the lockout/tagout before proceeding with their own assigned steps in the process. The permit system, then, should be developed to duplicate and reinforce, rather than dilute, responsibility.
Every step in processing a lockout/tagout permit, from the initial request to the official closing, should be confirmed in writing on an official form. The permit form should include spaces for every person involved to indicate the times and dates when the paperwork was received and when the action was taken.
Completion of each step should be acknowledged by the signature of the person responsible for taking the appropriate action. Every person involved in processing the permit should be held responsible for checking the paperwork referred to them to see that everything is in order before proceeding with their own step.
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