What are the examples of poor hazardous energy control practices.
The following items discuss some practices that were used in the past for safety control. These practices are not truly safe practices and should not be used today.
a) Locking out a push-button, control switch, or other pilot device does not ensure that the circuit will remain de-energized. A short circuit or ground in the control circuit can bypass the pilot device.
Another employee might even engage the contactor or starter by hand. Unless the disconnecting means is opened and locked out, an employee should not place himself in a position where unexpected equipment startup or energization might cause injury.
b) Turning the handle of a disconnect switch to the "off' position does not ensure safety. The switch linkage might be broken, leaving the switchblades engaged.
Switchblades in the open position should be confirmed by visual inspection. The load side of the switch should also be checked with a voltage tester to ensure that the outgoing circuit is de-energized, and that there is no backfeed.
c) Removing and tagging fuses does not constitute a lockout/tagout. A lockout/tagout device should be attached to the fuse clips in a manner such that no fuses can be inserted without removing the device.
If fuses are contained in a drawout fuse block, the tag should be attached to the fuse panel, not to the drawout block. Special precautions shall be taken to prevent shock whenever energized fuse clips that are accessible to the touch must be tagged.
d) Simply opening a power circuit breaker does not ensure safety. Even if the control fuses are removed, the breaker can still be engaged with the manual operating mechanism.
The switchgear must be racked away from the bus contacts and into the "fully disconnected" position, and the racking mechanism shall be locked and tagged.
LOCK OUT AND TAG OUT PERMIT BASIC INFORMATION
Some work requires rigid lockout/tagout control of the type that should not be the responsibility of the employee alone. Lockout/tagouts of this nature should be secured by a formal permit.
This more formal approach is called a documented lockout/tagout. Typically, this type of lockout/tagout would be used on those types of jobs that are not simple and easily understood.
Electrical work performed on medium- and high-voltage circuits is a good example. It would also include work on equipment that requires a complex lockout/tagout due to multiple sources of electrical energy.
Also included would be jobs that require work inside of grinding mills, choppers, fan housings, ovens, storage tanks and silos, and similar situations in which personnel are in a position that unexpected equipment start-up would, without question, result in serious injury or death.
In general, the documented lockout/tagout shall be used except when the conditions given in 29 CFR 1910.147 for a nondocumented lockout/tagout allow an exception.
No specific permit system can be recommended as good practice in all circumstances. A workable permit system can be developed only on an individual basis at the plant level by personnel intimately familiar with plant operations. Certain requirements that represent good practice in one plant might be inadequate or unworkable in another plant with different problems and a different personnel structure.
One fundamental feature, however, should be incorporated into any permit system. It should be designed with checks and balances.
Specific responsibility for a particular operation should be assigned to an individual without relieving others of the obligation to double-check the status of the lockout/tagout before proceeding with their own assigned steps in the process. The permit system, then, should be developed to duplicate and reinforce, rather than dilute, responsibility.
Every step in processing a lockout/tagout permit, from the initial request to the official closing, should be confirmed in writing on an official form. The permit form should include spaces for every person involved to indicate the times and dates when the paperwork was received and when the action was taken.
Completion of each step should be acknowledged by the signature of the person responsible for taking the appropriate action. Every person involved in processing the permit should be held responsible for checking the paperwork referred to them to see that everything is in order before proceeding with their own step.
This more formal approach is called a documented lockout/tagout. Typically, this type of lockout/tagout would be used on those types of jobs that are not simple and easily understood.
Electrical work performed on medium- and high-voltage circuits is a good example. It would also include work on equipment that requires a complex lockout/tagout due to multiple sources of electrical energy.
Also included would be jobs that require work inside of grinding mills, choppers, fan housings, ovens, storage tanks and silos, and similar situations in which personnel are in a position that unexpected equipment start-up would, without question, result in serious injury or death.
In general, the documented lockout/tagout shall be used except when the conditions given in 29 CFR 1910.147 for a nondocumented lockout/tagout allow an exception.
No specific permit system can be recommended as good practice in all circumstances. A workable permit system can be developed only on an individual basis at the plant level by personnel intimately familiar with plant operations. Certain requirements that represent good practice in one plant might be inadequate or unworkable in another plant with different problems and a different personnel structure.
One fundamental feature, however, should be incorporated into any permit system. It should be designed with checks and balances.
Specific responsibility for a particular operation should be assigned to an individual without relieving others of the obligation to double-check the status of the lockout/tagout before proceeding with their own assigned steps in the process. The permit system, then, should be developed to duplicate and reinforce, rather than dilute, responsibility.
Every step in processing a lockout/tagout permit, from the initial request to the official closing, should be confirmed in writing on an official form. The permit form should include spaces for every person involved to indicate the times and dates when the paperwork was received and when the action was taken.
Completion of each step should be acknowledged by the signature of the person responsible for taking the appropriate action. Every person involved in processing the permit should be held responsible for checking the paperwork referred to them to see that everything is in order before proceeding with their own step.
SAFE MAINTENANCE PRE PLAN FOR ELECTRICAL FACILITIES BASIC INFORMATION
The design of a facility and its electrical equipment should include consideration for future maintenance. In order to remain in good, safe condition, the electrical equipment and facilities must be maintained properly.
Dust and dirt, damaged enclosures and components, corrosion, loose connections, and reduced operating clearances can be the cause of employee injuries.
Some of these conditions can also lead to fire. A thorough, periodic preventive maintenance plan should be established as soon as new facilities and equipment are installed.
Local procedures should be created as soon as possible to cover the maintenance of electrical equipment. Most of this information can be obtained from recognized standards and manufacturer's literature.
Proper operation and maintenance are important to electrical safety because when things do not function as designed or planned, the results may be unexpected.
Many injuries and fatalities have occurred when the unexpected happened. NFPA 70B-1998 is an excellent guide to recommended practices for maintenance of electrical equipment.
It also contains the "why's" and the "wherefore's" of an electrical maintenance program, as well as guidance for maintaining and testing specific types of electrical equipment.
In addition, it contains information in its appendix regarding the suggested frequencies for performance of maintenance and testing. This is a good document to review while facilities are being installed.
Dust and dirt, damaged enclosures and components, corrosion, loose connections, and reduced operating clearances can be the cause of employee injuries.
Some of these conditions can also lead to fire. A thorough, periodic preventive maintenance plan should be established as soon as new facilities and equipment are installed.
Local procedures should be created as soon as possible to cover the maintenance of electrical equipment. Most of this information can be obtained from recognized standards and manufacturer's literature.
Proper operation and maintenance are important to electrical safety because when things do not function as designed or planned, the results may be unexpected.
Many injuries and fatalities have occurred when the unexpected happened. NFPA 70B-1998 is an excellent guide to recommended practices for maintenance of electrical equipment.
It also contains the "why's" and the "wherefore's" of an electrical maintenance program, as well as guidance for maintaining and testing specific types of electrical equipment.
In addition, it contains information in its appendix regarding the suggested frequencies for performance of maintenance and testing. This is a good document to review while facilities are being installed.
SOLID GROUNDING OF POWER SYSTEM BASIC INFORMATION AND TUTORIALS
What is a solidly grounded system?
Solid grounding refers to the connection of the neutral of a generator, power transformer, or grounding transformer directly to the station ground or to the earth. Because of the reactance of the grounded generator or transformer in series with the neutral circuit, a solid ground connection does not provide a zero-impedance neutral circuit.
If the reactance of the system zero-sequence circuit is too great with respect to the system positive-sequence reactance, the objectives sought in grounding, principally freedom from transient overvoltages, may not be achieved.
This is rarely a problem in typical industrial and commercial power systems. The zero-sequence impedance of most generators used in these systems is much lower than the positive-sequence impedance of these generators.
The zero-sequence impedance of a delta-wye transformer will not exceed the transformer's positive sequence impedance. There are, however, conditions under which relatively high zero-sequence impedance may occur.
One of these conditions is a power system fed by several generators and/or transformers in parallel. If the neutral of only one source is grounded, it is possible for the zero-sequence impedance of the grounded source to exceed the effective positive-sequence impedance of the several sources in parallel.
Another such condition may occur where power is distributed to remote facilities by an overhead line without a metallic ground return path. In this case, the return path for ground-fault current is through the earth, and, even though both the neutral of the source and the nonconducting parts at the load may be grounded with well-made electrodes, the ground return path includes the impedance of both of these ground electrodes.
This impedance may be significant. Another significant source of zero sequence impedance is the large line-to-ground spacing of the overhead line.
To ensure the benefits of solid grounding, it is necessary to determine the degree of grounding provided in the system. A good guide in answering this question is the magnitude of ground-fault current as compared to the system threephase fault current.
The higher the ground-fault current in relation to the three-phase fault current the greater the degree of grounding in the system.
Effectively grounded systems will have a line-to-ground short circuit current of at least 60% of the three-phase short-circuit value. In terms of resistance and reactance, effective grounding of a system is accomplished only when R0</=X1 and X0 </= 3X1 and such relationships exist at any point in the system.
The X1 component used in the above relation is the Thevenin equivalent positive-sequence reactance of the complete system including the subtransient reactance of all rotating machines.
Application of surge arresters for grounded-neutral service requires that the system be effectively grounded.
REACTANCE GROUNDING OF POWER SYSTEM BASIC INFORMATION
What is reactance grounding? How reactance grounding is beneficial?
The term reactance grounding describes the case in which a reactor is connected between the system neutral and ground.
Since the ground-fault that may flow in a reactance-grounded system is a function of the neutral reactance, the magnitude of the ground-fault current is often used as a criterion for describing the degree of grounding.
In a reactance-grounded system, the available ground-fault current should be at least 25% and preferably 60% of the threephase fault current to prevent serious transient overvoltages (X0 </=X1).
This is considerably higher than the level of fault current desirable in a resistance-grounded system, and therefore reactance grounding is usually not considered an alternative to resistance grounding.
In most generators, solid grounding, that is, grounding without external impedance, may permit the maximum ground fault current from the generator to exceed the maximum three-phase fault current that the generator can deliver and for which its windings are braced.
Consequently, neutral-grounded generators should be grounded through a low-value reactor that will limit the ground-fault current to a value no greater than the generator three-phase fault current.
In the case of three-phase four-wire systems, the limitation of ground-fault current to 100% of the three-phase fault current is usually practical without interfering with normal four-wire operation.
In practice, reactance grounding is generally used only in this case and to ground substation transformers with similar characteristics.
The term reactance grounding describes the case in which a reactor is connected between the system neutral and ground.
Since the ground-fault that may flow in a reactance-grounded system is a function of the neutral reactance, the magnitude of the ground-fault current is often used as a criterion for describing the degree of grounding.
In a reactance-grounded system, the available ground-fault current should be at least 25% and preferably 60% of the threephase fault current to prevent serious transient overvoltages (X0 </=X1).
This is considerably higher than the level of fault current desirable in a resistance-grounded system, and therefore reactance grounding is usually not considered an alternative to resistance grounding.
In most generators, solid grounding, that is, grounding without external impedance, may permit the maximum ground fault current from the generator to exceed the maximum three-phase fault current that the generator can deliver and for which its windings are braced.
Consequently, neutral-grounded generators should be grounded through a low-value reactor that will limit the ground-fault current to a value no greater than the generator three-phase fault current.
In the case of three-phase four-wire systems, the limitation of ground-fault current to 100% of the three-phase fault current is usually practical without interfering with normal four-wire operation.
In practice, reactance grounding is generally used only in this case and to ground substation transformers with similar characteristics.
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